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The United States firmly believes that a strong and active inter-
national court is an indispensable element of an international legal
order. Prevention of the use or threat of force to settle international
disputes is essential to the maintenance of international peace and
security, and is most effectively assured by the development of an
international legal order and resort to a strong and respected court.2
I. INTRODUCTION
In this, the United Nations' Decade of International Law, a primary
goal of which is to ensure full respect for the International Court
of Justice,3 the United States and its allies have dealt the Court yet
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Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention
arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.S.), 1992 I.C.J. 3 (Apr.
14) (request for the indication of provisional measures); Questions of Interpretation
and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident
at Lockerbie (Libya v. U.K.), 1992 I.C.J. 3 (Apr. 14) (request for the indication
of provisional measures). References in the text are to the United Kingdom judgments.
I United States' response to the United Nations Secretary-General's questionnaire
on the Role of the Court, 1974 Report of the Secretary-General (A/8382 at 13)
[hereinafter United States' Response].
I United Nations Decade of International Law, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 60th
mtg. at 31, U.N. Doc. 44/23 (1989) (declaring 1990-1999 the Decade of International
Law, with one of its main purposes being "[tjo promote means and methods for
the peaceful settlement of disputes between States, including resort to and full respect
for the International Court of Justice").
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another blow 4 this time in the ongoing attempt to destabilize the
regime of Libya's Muammar el-Qaddafi.5 The United States has, of
course, a long history of institutional engineering of the United
Nations Charter for immediate political goals. 6 On this occasion,
using its new found ascendancy on the Security Council, the United
States was able to use that organ to bring pressure on Libya to force
an extradition of Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi and Lamen Khalifa
Fhimah, two Libyans who were indicted by a federal grand jury for
the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 which crashed over Lockerbie,
Scotland in 1985.1 The United States was also able to block a Libyan
appeal for interim measures in the International Court when the
Security Council, acting under Chapter VII, adopted Resolution 7488
three days after the Court hearing and before a judgment was issued
which ordered sanctions if Libya failed to hand over the alleged
bombers.
The Court rejected Libya's request for interim measures on the
basis that Libya's obligations under Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter
prevailed over any rights Libya may have under the 1971 Montreal
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
of Civil Aviation (Sabotage).9 The Court considered that whatever
the situation prior to the adoption of Resolution 748, it was no longer
appropriate to grant provisional measures. In part this was due to
the fact that to do so would likely impair the rights that the United
States and the United Kingdom derived from Resolution 748.10
4 The first blow was the Nicaragua decision. Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). For a discussion
of the impact of the decision on the Court, see EDWARD MCWHINNEY, Q.C., THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE WESTERN TRADITION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 99-136 (1987).
1 Bernard Gwertzman, Tension Over Libya: Trying to Topple Qaddafi, N.Y.
TIMAS, Apr. 18, 1986, at Al (indicating that the Tripoli raid was part of an ongoing
attempt to unseat Qaddafi).
6 Thomas M. Franck, U.S. Foreign Policy and the U.N., 14 DEN. J. INT'L L.
& POL'Y 159, 163-68 (1986).
1 These individuals were similarly charged by the Scottish Lord Advocate with
the same offence. Announcement by the Lord Advocate of Scotland on 14 November
1991, 31 I.L.M. 718-721 (1992).
1 U.N. S.C. Res. 748, reprinted in, 31 I.L.M. 749 (1992). See Annex B for the
text of the Resolution.
I Convention on Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter Convention
on Suppression].
10 Libya v. U.K., 1992 I.C.J. at 15, para. 41.
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II. THE FACTS OF THE CASE
On the 21st of December 1988, Pan Am flight 103 exploded over
Lockerbie killing all 259 people aboard and eleven on the ground."
Although there was evidence implicating Iran and Syria in the bomb-
ing,' 2 United States and Scottish investigators, relying on fragments
of a timer, identified the above mentioned Libyan agents as being
responsible for the bombing. Following the indictment of the sus-
pects before a grand jury in the District of Columbia and a charge
by the Lord Advocate in Scotland, 4 the United States and the United
Kingdom issued a joint declaration on the 27th of November 1991,
calling on Libya to surrender for trial those indicted, to supply
information relating to the crime, and to immediately pay appropriate
compensation. 5
Libya claimed that its domestic law did not permit the extradition
of nationals, 16 but agreed to institute proceedings against the suspects
and requested assistance from United States and United Kingdom
investigators. 17 Libya also offered an opportunity for observers from
the two countries to be present at the proceedings.' s These requests
were apparently ignored. On the 21st of January 1992, the Security
Council passed Resolution 731 which expressed concern over the
results of the indictment implicating officials of the Libyan govern-
Steve Lohr, For Lockerbie, Therapy of Self-Help, N.Y. TIMES INT'L, Dec. 31,
1988, at A3.
12 Clyde Haberman, Israelis Remain Convinced Syrians Downed Flight 103, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 1991, at A14; Roy Rowan, Pan Am 103: Why Did They Die?,
TIr, Apr. 27, 1992, at 24, 29.
11 Andrew Rosenthal, U.S. Accuses Libya as 2 are Charged in Pan Am Bombing,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1991, at Al.
14 Id.
11 Libya v. U.K., 1992 I.C.J. at 11, para. 28; David Johnston, U.S. and British
Demand the 2 Libyans, N.Y. TIMES INT'L, Nov. 28, 1991, at A3.
16 Libya v. U.K., 1992 I.C.J. at 51 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting); Libyan Criminal
Code, 28 November 1953, arts. 8-10; Criminal Procedure Code, 28 November 1953,
arts. 493-510.
17 Libya Seeks Evidence Behind Charges in Pan Am Bombing, N.Y. TIMEs INT'L,
Nov. 19, 1991, at A18.
18 Libya v. U.K., 1992 I.C.J. at 51 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting). Those suspected
of the bombing were described in Resolution 731 as Libyan 'officials'. See infra
note 20. The Lord Advocate of Scotland described the two accused as allegedly
being members of the Libyan Intelligence Service: Megrahi also held positions with
the Libyan Arab Airlines and as the Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies in
Tripoli and Fhima was Station Officer with the Libyan Arab Airlines in Malta. See
Resolution 748 supra note 8, at 718-19.
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ment and deplored Libya's lack of response to the United States'
and United Kingdom's joint declaration. 9
On the 3rd of March, Libya filed two applications in the Inter-
national Court, relying on Article 14(1) of the Montreal Convention,2"
contending that it had not been possible to settle the dispute by
negotiation and that the parties had been unable to agree on the
organization of an arbitration. Libya contended that the United States
and the United Kingdom had rejected Libyan efforts to resolve the
matter under the framework of international law and the Convention
and that both Countries were pressuring Libya into surrendering the
Libyan nationals. 2' In one application, Libya requested the Court to
declare on the legality of the actions of the respective parties under
the Convention, 22 and in the other, it asked the Court to enjoin the
United States and the United Kingdom from taking action to compel
or coerce Libya into surrendering the accused and to ensure that no
steps be taken that would prejudice the rights of Libya with respect
to the legal proceedings that were the subject of the application. 23
The Court heard the matter on the 26th to the 28th of March
1992. Three days later, on the 31st of March 1992, the Security
Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, adopted Resolution
748 wherein Libya was called upon to extradite the individuals con-
cerned by the 15th of April or suffer sanctions. 24 On the 14th of
April the International Court denied interim measures. 25 On the 15th
,9 U.N. SC Res. 731, 31 I.L.M. 732 (1992). See Annex A for the text of the
Resolution.
2 Article 14(1) provides:
Any Dispute between two or more Contracting States concerning the in-
terpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be settled
through negotiation, shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to
arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration
the Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any
one of those Parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of
Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court.
Convention on Suppression, supra note 10, 24 U.S.T. at 572, 974 U.N.T.S. at
183.
21 Libya v. U.K., 1992 I.C.J. at 5-6, paras. 5, 6.
22 Id. at 7, para. 7.
23 Id. at 7, para. 9.
24 Bryan Boswell, World Fears Gaddafi's Hostages Ace, Tm AUsTL., Apr. 2,
1992, at 6. The resolution imposed sanctions in the areas of civil aviation, arms,
and diplomatic staffing. For a detailed description of the sanctions imposed see
Resolution 748, supra note 8.
23 IN FAVOUR OF THE COURT'S DECISION: Vice-President Oda, Acting
President; President Sir Robert Jennings; Judges Lachs, Ago, Schwebel, Ni, Evensen,
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of April sanctions were imposed. 26 Subsequently, the Libyan General
Peoples Congress has passed a tentative resolution approving of the
surrender of the suspects,27 and the Libyan government has supplied
the British intelligence service with the names of I.R.A. terrorists
trained in special camps in Libya. 28
III. THE BASIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION
In its brief judgment denying interim measures, the Court stated
that the parties were obliged to carry out the decisions of the Security
Council in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter, and that at
the interim measures stage of the proceedings, Resolution 748 was
prima facie binding on the parties. 29 In accordance with Article 103
of the Charter, the obligations of the parties under this Resolution
superseded any obligations under other instruments, ° including the
Montreal Convention. 3' The indication of provisional measures would
also prima facie deprive the United States and the United Kingdom
of their rights under the Resolution. 32 The Court made it clear that
Tarassov, Guillaume, Shahabuddeen, Aguilar Mawdsley; AGAINST: Judges Bed-
jaoui, Weeramantry, Ranjeva, Ajibola; Judge ad-hoc El-Kosheri. Libya v. U.K.,
1992 I.C.J. at 15.
26 Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to Paragraph 8 of Security Council
Resolution 748, May 22, 1992, U.N. Doc. S/23992, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 755
(1992). See Annex B, for the sanctions imposed.
27 Libyan Surrender, THE AUSTL., June 18, 1992, at 8; see also, LONDoN TIMEs,
June 13, 1992, at 16.
21 James Adams, Gaddafi Gives MI5 List of IRA Terrorists, THE AUSTL., June
22, 1992, at 8.
29 Libya v. U.K., 1992 I.C.J. at 15, para. 39.
30 Article 103 reads:
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any
other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter
shall prevail.
U.N. CHARTER art. 103.
31 Libya v. U.K., 1992 I.C.J. at 15, para. 39.
32 Id. at 15, para. 41. The particular rights, of which the United Kingdom and
the United States might prima facie be deprived by the indication of provisional
measures, were those demanded of the Joint Declaration of the United States and
the United Kingdom of November 27, 1991. This called on Libya to:
-Surrender for trial all those charged with the crime; and accept responsibility
for the actions of Libyan officials;
-Disclose all it knows of this crime, including the names of all those
responsible, and allow full access to all witnesses, documents and other
19921
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it was not definitively deciding the legal effect of Resolution 748 or
its jurisdiction to entertain the merits of the case.33 The Court may
therefore have to ultimately determine the legitimacy of the Resolution
in terms of the Charter and could make an order inconsistent with
the Security Council's Resolution. The effect of the decision is that,
in the interim, the respondent states may utilize the prima facie
presumption of legitimacy in order to pressure Libya into extraditing
the alleged offenders.
Of the majority, Judges Evensen, Tarassov, Guillaume and Aguilar
Mawdsley appended a joint declaration vindicating the Court's judg-
ment, particularly the reliance of the Court on the Security Council's
Resolution. They characterized the situation as being one where the
parties were within their rights to insist on different things: the United
States and the United Kingdom to insist on the extradition and Libya
to refuse extradition.3 4 In insisting on extradition, the respondent
states were entitled to utilize any method consistent with international
law.35 They also considered that the Security Council, if unhappy
with this impasse, could, acting within the framework of Chapter
VII, issue the resolutions compelling Libya to extradite, and the Court
could properly take note of this change of circumstances.3 6 These
judges seem, therefore, to characterize the matter in terms of a
political change of circumstance not impinging on the authority of
the Court.
Judges Shahabuddeen and Lachs similarly thought that the basis
of the Court's order on Resolution 748 was legitimate. Shahabuddeen
preferred to view this situation not as a conflict between the Security
Council and the Court, but rather as a conflict between the obligations
of Libya under the Charter and under the Convention.3 7 Judge Lachs,
on the other hand, considered that the two organs of the United
material evidence, including all the remaining timers;
-Pay appropriate compensation.
Joint Declaration of the United States and United Kingdom, Nov. 27, 1991, 31
I.L.M. 723.
Resolution 748 required in para. 1 that Libya immediately comply with para. 3
of Resolution 731 which in turn urged Libya to comply with the demands made in
the Statement of November 27. See Annexes A and B.
11 Libya v. U.K., 1992 I.C.J. at 15, paras. 40, 42.
4 Id.
11 Id. at 24, paras. 1-2 (joint declaration of Judges Evensen, Tarassov, Guillaume
and Aguilar Mawdsley).
316 Id. at 25, para. 4.
17 Id. at 29 (separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
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Nations with power to render binding decisions should act in harmony,
although not in concert, without prejudicing the exercise of power
by each other. The Security Council having already acted, the Court
was faced with a new situation in which it could not indicate effective
interim measures. Failure to act was not an abdication of the Court's
powers, but rather a reflection on the system under which the Court
has to operate.38
The Security Council's action and the reliance of the Court on
Resolution 748, however, troubled many of the judges, including
some of the majority, because they saw a source of potential conflict
between the Court and the Security Council, and a possible challenge
to the Court's jurisdiction under the Charter. Of the majority, two
judges preferred to refuse the indication of provisional measures on
grounds other than the Resolution. 39 Acting President Oda thought
that the Court should have based the denial on the ground that the
encroachments on which Libya's claim for provisional measures were
based related to Libya's sovereign rights under public international
law and not the Convention. 4° No state is obliged to extradite its
own nationals unless there is a treaty obligation to the contrary. 4' A
state has a right to exercise jurisdiction over crimes committed in its
own territory and may claim jurisdiction over crimes committed
abroad by aliens if it affects its national security, or if there is
universal jurisdiction. 42 The reinforcement of an extradition request
could be deemed contrary to international law as being an encroach-
ment on the sovereign rights of the holding state. 43 Thus, the appli-
cation relates to protection of sovereign rights under general
international law and not to the rights of Libya under the Con-
vention." As the basis of Libya's application was to seek a declaratory
judgment on the application of the Convention, Judge Oda would
not have indicated interim measures whether or not the Security
Council had adopted Resolution 748. 41 On this analysis the Court
38 Id. at 27 (separate opinion of Judge Lachs).
9 Id. at 20 [section IV] (declaration of Acting President Oda); Id. at 23 [final
para.] (declaration of Judge Ni).
40 Id. at 18-19 [section III, unnumbered paras. 1-2] (declaration of Acting President
Oda).
4 Id. at 18-19 [section III, unnumbered para. 11.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 19 [section III, unnumbered para. 2].
" Id. at 19 [section IV].
41 Id. at 18-19 (declaration of Acting President Oda).
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could not be criticized for not acting before the Security Council.4
Judge Ni similarly preferred to base his decision to deny Libya's
request for interim measures solely on the ground that the six month
period provided by Article 14(1) of the Convention for a negotiated
settlement had not yet elapsed. 47
Of the dissenting judges, Judge Bedjaoui was strongly critical of
the Court for its reliance on Resolution 748. He viewed this as a
matter extrinsic to the application and the reliance on it cast doubt
on the integrity of the judicial function. The Court's order was not
based on its discretionary power to refuse to indicate provisional
measures, but appeared to be directly linked to the decision of the
Security Council which bore directly on the very subject matter of
the dispute. 48 The other dissenting judges, Weeramantry, 49 Ranjeva,50
Bola Ajibola,5" and Ad Hoc Judge El-Kosheri,52 thought that the
Court could and should indicate interim measures despite Resolution
748.
IV. LIBYA'S RIGHTS UNDER THE MONTREAL CONVENTION
The Montreal Convention is one of three multilateral treaties dealing
with international terrorist acts against aviation.53 It was unfortunate,
to say the least, that on the first occasion that a state was charged
with supporting terrorist organizations it was not given an opportunity
to show its bona fides under the Convention. The clear implication
of the respondents' joint declaration is that Libyan judicial officials
would be incapable of dealing with the matter in an impartial way.
There is some irony in this as the United Kingdom certainly does
not have a sterling record insofar as its treatment of persons accused
of terrorist acts is concerned.5 4 Also, the extensive publicity put
46 Id. at 19.
41 Id. at 23 (declaration of Judge Ni).
48 Id. at 40, para. 16 (Bedjaoui, J., dissenting).
49 Id. at 50 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
o Id. at 73, para. 6 (Ranjeva, J., dissenting).
Id. at 88 (Ajibola, J., dissenting).
S2 Id. at 107, para. 47 (E1-Kosheri, Ad-hoc J., dissenting).
S3 See Convention on Supression, supra note 9; Convention on Offenses and
Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941,
704 U.N.T.S. 219; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft
(Hijacking), Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105.
4 See Sheila Rule, New Investigation Urged in I.R.A. Case, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct.
28, 1989, at 15; Kevin Toolis, When British Justice Failed, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 25,




forward in the press by United States officials against Libya generally
and specifically implicating Libya in the bombing would make it
difficult for the suspects to receive an impartial jury trial." Added
to this is the strong inference in the joint communique that the
respondent states had pre-tried the suspects and found them guilty.56
A. The Six Month Arbitration Period
Various judges in the Lockerbie decision commented on Libya's
right to bring the application within the six month period and its
rights to try the suspects under the Montreal Convention. Article 14
of the Montreal Convention5 7 provides for a six month period for
the parties to arrange an arbitration. After this period, if the parties
fail to agree on the organization of an arbitration, the matter can
be referred to the Court.5" Libya contended that the light of the
respondents' inflexibility in their demands, further negotiation was
pointless. 9 Judge Weeramantry agreed on the basis that if one party
has repudiated the negotiation process, they cannot in turn insist that
the other party abide by the original time frame while the first party,
free from the conciliatory and judicial process, may pursue non-
conciliatory procedures. 60 Judge Bola Ajibola considered that the
Court should not adopt a rigid approach to the six month requirement
in view of the fact that had Libya waited for the period to elapse
they still would have met with a refusal to arbitrate. Moreover, the
use of the wording "If within six months from the date of the request
for arbitration . . ." of Article 14(1)61 indicates that it is the demand
11 Libya v. U.K., 1992 I.C.J. at 112, para. 63 (El-Kosheri, Ad-hoc J., dissenting);
Id. at 31-32 (separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen); see also Rosenthal, supra
note 13, at Al.
56 Libya v. U.K., supra note 1, at 29-30 (separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
11 Convention on Suppression, supra note 9, art. 14(1) provides:
Any dispute between two or more Contracting States concerning the in-
terpretation or application of this Convention which cannot be settled
through negotiation, shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to
arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration
the Parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any
one of those Parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of
Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court.
Id.
58 Id.
19 Libya v. U.K., 1992 I.C.J. at 6, para. 6.
60 Id. at 51 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
61 Convention on Suppression, supra note 9, art. 14, para. 1.
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and refusal within the period that triggers the right of appeal to the
Court .62
Judge Bedjaoui 63 and Ad-hoc Judge El-Kosheri 4 agreed with the
two points made by Bola Ajibola. Acting President Oda also thought
that, given the circumstances of the case, it would be overly legalistic
to require the six month waiting period. 65 Judge Ni alone would have
denied Libya's application to the Court on the basis that it was
premature."
B. Libya's Right to Try the Suspects and to Refuse Extradition
The United States and the United Kingdom argued that Libya had
no rights that could be protected by interim measures since the
Montreal Convention imposed obligations but did not confer rights. 67
Judges Evensen, Tarassov, Guillaume, and Aguilar in their joint
declaration had no doubt that, under customary international law,
Libya had a right to refuse to extradite the suspects, and that the
refusal to extradite did not necessarily give rise to any action on the
part of the soliciting state. 6 The Montreal Convention did not create
an obligation to extradite; its sole implication being that a failure to
extradite meant that the affair should be submitted to the competent
Libyan authorities .69
Judge Bedjaoui considered that the Montreal Convention covered
not only acts of individual terrorism, but also acts of state-sponsored
terrorism against aircraft. He noted that the Convention could prove
ineffectual in the latter cases if the sponsoring state decides to try
the individuals itself. 70 He thought, however, that the Convention
62 Libya v. U.K., 1992 I.C.J. at 83-84, para. 5 (Ajibola, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 36-37, para. 9 (Bedjaoui, J., dissenting).
6" Id. at 108-09, paras. 50-53 (El-Kosheri, Ad-hoc J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 18 (declaration of Acting President Oda).
Id. at 22-23 (declaration of Judge Ni).
67 Id. at 38, para. 11 (Bedjaoui, J., dissenting).
"In so far as general international law is concerned, extradition is a sovereign
decision of the requested State, which is never under an obligation to carry it out.
Moreover, in general internation law there is no obligation to prosecute in default
of extradition." Id. at 24, para. 2 (joint declaration of Judges Evensen, Tarassov,
Guillaume and Aguilar Mawdsley).
69 Id. at 24, para. 2, refering to Art. 5 requiring states to establish domestic
jurisdiction over the acts in question, Art. 8 permitting the Convention on Suppression
to be used as an extradition treaty between Member States without requiring extra-
dition, and Art. 7 requiring Member States to extradite or submit the matter to
their competent authorities.
70 Id. at 37, para. 10 (Bedjaoui, J., dissenting).
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clearly gave Libya the option of trying the suspects or extraditing
them and, moreover, that a state should be able to protect a right
fundamentally derived from its sovereignty and not be hindered in
carrying out its international obligations. 7' Judges Weeramantry, Ran-
jeva, Bola Ajibola, and El-Kosheri also thought that Libya had the
right to try or extradite the suspects under the Convention. 2
V. THE RESPECTIVE POWERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE
COURT
A. Litispendence, the Security Council and the Court Prior to
Lockerbie
In his dissenting judgment in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, Judge
Alvarez thought that if a case submitted to the Court should constitute
a threat to world peace, the Security Council may seize itself of the
case and put an end to the Court's jurisdiction. 73 This seems an
overly broad statement, particularly in light of the Court's power to
determine its own jurisdiction.74 The practice of the Security Council
has indicated that, while that organ does not deny itself the right to
proceed with a matter being dealt with by the Court, it has generally
not proceeded with a matter pending judicial determination.75 This
was the first time that the two organs of the United Nations with
power of imposing mandatory orders on states have come into po-
tential conflict.
In the past the Security Council has either deferred to the Court
or, because of the veto, been unable to act. In the Corfu Channel
case (Merits), 76 the Security Council recommended that the parties
11 Id. at 38-39, para. 12.
72 Id. at 68-69 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting); id. at 72, para. 2 (Ranjeva, J.,
dissenting); id. at 81-82, para. 3 (Ajibola, J., dissenting); id. at 95, para. 4 (El-
Kosheri, Ad-hoc J., dissenting).
n Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., (U.K. v. Iran) 1952 I.C.J. 93, at 134 (Preliminary
Objection of July 22) (Alvarez, J., dissenting).
7 Article 36(6) of the Court's Statute provides that in the event of a dispute as
to whether the Court has jurisdiction the matter shall be settled by a decision of
the Court. Even without such a provision, an international tribunal, absent any
agreement to the contrary, has the right to determine its own jurisdiction; Nottebohm
Case (Liech. v. Guat.), 1953 I.C.J. 111 at 119-120 (Preliminary Objection).
11 For instances of practice in the Security Council and the General Assembly
see Dan Ciobanu, Litspendence Between the International Court of Justice and the
Political Organs of the United Nations, in 1 TIHE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE, 209, 224-25 (Leo Gross ed., 1976).
76 Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr. 9) (Merits).
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should immediately refer their dispute to the Court. 77 In the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Co. case, 78 the Security Council adjourned its debate until
the International Court had ruled on its own competence in the
matter. 79 In the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case,8 0 the Security
Council invited Greece and Turkey to, "take into account the con-
tribution that appropriate judicial means, in particular the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, are qualified to make to the settlement of
... their dispute."'" Finally, in the Hostages case8 2 the United States
was seeking essentially the same remedies in the Security Council as
it was in the Court but was eventually only able to get a recommendary
resolution, 3 and in the Nicaragua decision,8 Nicaragua failed to get
the Security Council to act on its behalf.85 The General Assembly
has similarly deferred voting on a motion which might have preempted
an opinion of the Court. 6 It is interesting to note that in the early
days of the Court, some states, in order to prevent this conflict from
arising, made a specific reservation to the jurisdiction of the Court
suspending proceedings in any dispute in which the Security Council
was exercising its functions.8 7
' Id. at 24.
78 Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (U.K. v. Iran), 1952 I.C.J. 93 (July 22).
79 U.N. SCOR, 6th Sess., 565th mtg. at 12, U.N. Doc. S/PV.565 (1951).
80 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. 3 (Interim Pro-
tection Order of Sept. 11).
11 S.C. Res. 395, U.N. SCOR, 31st Sess., 1953rd mtg. at 15, 16, U.N. Doc. S/
12187 (1976).
82 Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1979 I.C.J. 7 (Order of Provisional Measures of Dec. 15).
83 S.C. Res. 461, U.N. SCOR, 34th Sess., 2184th mtg. at 24-25, U.N. Doc. S/
13711 /Rev.1 (1979). A draft resolution calling for sanctions was vetoed by the Soviet
Union. See U.S. Asks Security Council To Impose Sanctions Against Iran, 80 DEP'T
ST. BULL., Feb., at 68-71.
84 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 169 (Order of Provisional Measures of May 10).
11 Id. at 392, 432. See also MCWHNNEY, supra note 4, at 106-07, for the
subsequent history of Nicaragua's attempt to have the Court's order enforced.
86 Voting Procedure on Questions Relating to Reports and Petitions Concerning
the Territory of South West Africa, U.N. GAOR, Plenary Meetings, 328 (1954);
G.A. Res. 904 (IX), U.N. GAOR, 9th Sess., Supp. No. 21, U.N. Doc. A/2890.
For a general discussion of the uneven practice of the General Assembly, see Ciobanu,
supra note 76, at 218-226.
87 See Texts Governing the Jurisdiction of the Court, 1953-54 I.C.J.Y.B. 201,
210-11 (reservation of Australia in its declaration of 6 Feb. 1954); see also Texts
Governing the Jurisdiction of the Court, 1988-89 I.C.J.Y.B. 54, 78-81 (reservations
of Malta and Mauritius excluding disputes arising from a discharge of functions
pursuant to recommendation or decision of an organ of the United Nations).
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B. The Objection Lis Pendens in the Lockerbie Case
During the Lockerbie debates several delegates thought that the
Security Council should wait until the Court had made a determi-
nation."' The Zimbabwe delegate thought the action of the Security
Council could lead to a major institutional crisis.8 9 Ten members,
including Russia, voted in favour of the Resolution with five ab-
stentions, including China.9 China's abstention raises again the Article
27(3) difficulty of the requirement of a concurring vote by permanent
members .9
After the adoption of Resolution 748, the Court called on the
parties to make observations on the effect of the Resolution.9 2 Libya's
contention was that the Security Council was infringing on its rights
under the Convention as well as its rights under international law;
that the risk of contradiction between the Resolution and the pro-
visional measures requested did not make the application inadmissible
as there was no hierarchy between the Court and the Security Council;
and that the Security Council had acted contrary to international law
and was employing Chapter VII merely as a means of depriving Libya
of its rights under the Montreal Convention. 93
Under Article 25 of the Charter, members of the United Nations
"agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council
in accordance with the present Charter. ' 94 Without commenting on
the legal effect of Resolution 748, the Court was prepared to give
the Resolution prima facie legitimacy for the purposes of the request
for interim measures. 95 The majority was not, therefore, prepared to
make any express comments on the respective powers of the Council
and the Court. Other members of the Court were not so reticent.
88 U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3063rd mtg. at 46, 52-53, 58, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3063
(1992) (statements of representatives of Cape Verde, Zimbabwe, and India).
89 Id. at 53.
90 Voting for Resolution 748 were the United States, United Kingdom, France,
Russia, Austria, Belgium, Ecuador, Hungary, Japan, and Venezuela; abstaining were
China, Cape Verde, India, Morocco, and Zimbabwe. Boswell, supra note 25, at 6.
91 Decisions of the Security Council on all non procedural matters, "shall be
made by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the
permanent members." U.N. CHARTER art. 27(3).
92 Libya v. U.K., 1992 I.C.J. at 14, para.-34.
91 Id. at 14, paras. 35-36.
94 U.N. CHARTER art. 25.
91 Libya v. U.K., 1992 I.C.J. at 14, paras. 39, 40.
19921
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
C. Judge Bedjaoui's Dissenting Opinion
Of the dissenting judges, Judge Bedjaoui was perhaps most critical
of the actions of the Security Council. He noted that for the first
time there was the possibility of one organ of the United Nations
influencing the decision of the other and the possibility of conflict
between the two decisions. 96 On the facts of the case, he questioned
the prudence of the Council in acting under Chapter VII: how is it
that three years after the event the matter now constitutes an imminent
threat to peace? He also noted that the evidence implicating the
accused did not appear strong and drew attention to General Assembly
Resolution 41/38 of November 20, 1986, indicating that the United
States was engaging in a campaign of misinformation against Libya. 91
Insofar as the respective powers of the Security Council and the
Court were concerned, Judge Bedjaoui recognized that the two organs
were being asked to decide different questions. The Council considered
Libya's international responsibility for state sponsored terrorism, while
the Court considered the question of the rights of the parties under
the Convention. Moreover, the Court was making a legal determi-
nation and the Council a political one. It was the parties' right to
both legal and political determination of the matter which led to the
possibility of contradictory solutions. The Security Council's Reso-
lution created a grey area of overlapping jurisdiction; however, while
the Court could not be used as a Court of Appeal against the decision
of the Security Council, the Security Council should not subvert the
integrity of the Court's legal function. 98
The Court, not having been asked to deal with the question of
international responsibility for state sponsored terrorism, could not
address that matter. 99 Judge Bedjaoui also recognized the Security
Council as the sole determiner of the position of a political dispute.'°°
He thought that while the Court should not interfere with the decision
of the Security Council, that policy should only be maintained insofar
as the Security Council does not interfere with the judicial function
of the Court. 0' Here, the very raison d'etre of the Court's function
had been affected. 0 2 His Honor thought that the Security Council
96 Id. at 33, para. 2 (Bedjaoui, J., dissenting).
91 Id. at 41-43, paras. 18-21.
91 Id. at 34-35, paras. 4-7.
Id. at 41-42, para. 18.
I00 d. at 42-43, para. 20.
101 Id. at 46, para. 27.
102 Id. at 44, para. 22.
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was bound to respect the goals and aims of the Charter to which it
owed its existence. Under Article 1(1), the Security Council is obliged
to adhere to the principles of international law and justice. 103 As the
Court is unable to make pronouncements on the constitutional validity
of the Resolution, it benefits from a prima facie validity. However,
Judge Bedjaoui thought that this was only the case if the Resolution
were not an attempt to deprive the Court of its jurisdiction, as opposed
to an attempt to deprive Libya of its rights. The former would deprive
the Resolution of its effectiveness even at this stage of the proceedings.
His Honor thought that it would be manifestly incompatible with
the Charter if one organ were to prevent another from fulfilling its
duties or to place it in a position of subordination.3 0 He regretted
that the Security Council did not seek an advisory opinion of the
Court since Article 36 of the Charter requires that all legal disputes
be addressed to the Court. 05 Under the circumstances of the case,
Judge Bedjaoui thought that the Court should have indicated pro-
visional measures even though their effect had been annihilated by
the Council's action. Moreover, if the Court had thought that Libya
would be unable to fulfill some condition before the indication of
the requested provisional measures, he thought that the Court could
have made a positive contribution to the Resolution of the dispute
by indicating general proprio motu measures.' °6
D. Judge Weeramantry's Dissenting Opinion
Judge Weeramantry's dissent also pointed to the difference between
the legal and political roles of the Court and the Security Council
in the United Nations system, and the duty that both organs owe to
the Charter. He thought that the interpretation of the Charter is
primarily a matter of law, and that when a matter is properly brought
before the Court, it becomes the guardian of the Charter and inter-
national law. °7 The Court, in the performance of its functions, will
often come to conclusions consonant with those of the Security
Council, but it does not follow that the Court should cooperate with
the Security Council to the extent of desisting from exercising its
independent power in a matter properly before it. 108 Judge Weera-
,o3 Id. at 45-46, paras. 24-26.
104 Id. at 47, para. 29.
101 Id. at 42, para. 9.
106 Id. at 48-49, paras. 32-34.
107 Id. at 53-55 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 58.
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mantry similarly thought that the Court should act on the basis of
the validity of the Security Council Resolution. Under Chapter VII,
the existence of a threat to peace is entirely within the discretion of
the Council. He thought that Libya was bound by Resolution 748
even though it conflicted with the rights claimed by Libya under the
Montreal Convention.' °9 His Honor, after referring to the travaux
preparatoires of the Charter, stated:
that a clear limitation on the plenitude of the Security Council's
powers is that those powers must be exercised in accordance with
the well-established principles of international law. It is true this
limitation must be restrictively interpreted and is confined only to
the principles and objects which appear in Chapter 1 of the Charter
... (T)he restriction nevertheless exists.110
Although Resolution 748 was binding, Judge Weeramantry thought
that there was still room for the Court to frame appropriate measures
proprio motu, while preserving full respect for the Resolution. In
this context he would have indicated provisional measures against
both parties preventing aggravation or extension of the dispute as
might result from the use of force."'
E. Judge Ranjeva's Dissenting Opinion
Judge Ranjeva, in his dissenting opinion, also believed that it was
impossible for the Court to ignore Resolution 748. The first paragraph
of the Resolution altered the legal framework while leaving the factual
situation unmodified. The Resolution deprived any provisional meas-
ures which the Court might have indicated of any effect." 2 Referring
to the Admissions advisory opinion," 3 Judge Ranjeva thought that
the Security Council cannot, simply by virtue of being a political
organ, deviate from the provisions of the Charter-particularly insofar
as limitations on power are concerned. The Court could indicate
proprio motu measures under Article 41 of the Statute independently
of the applicant's request. Such measures would have called upon
the parties not to aggravate or extend the dispute. While this might
raise the objection that it goes beyond the strict legal function of
1,' Id. at 65-67.
11 Id. at 65.
- Id. at 70-71.
12 Id. at 73-74, para. 8 (Ranjeva, J., dissenting).
" Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations,
1948 I.C.J. 56, 64 (Advisory Opinion of May 28).
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the Court, Judge Ranjeva believed this was fully in accordance with
the Court's general duty under Article 1 of the Statute to act in a
dynamic fashion with respect to pursuing the broader aims of main-
taining international peace. In the Frontier Dispute 4 and the Passage
Through the Great Belt"5 cases, the Court had acted proprio motu
not only in issuing an appeal to the parties to negotiate, but also in
seizing upon extra-judicial means in an attempt to bring an end to
the dispute. The Security Council's action meant that the matter was
no longer limited to a dispute between the parties in that it raised
the question of the collective security of all states and their people.
Because of this, the Court should not have taken a passive role, but
should have challenged the qualification introduced by the Security
Council and reminded the parties of their duty to avoid aggravating
the dispute.
Judge Ranjeva thought that the Court should have pronounced on
the merits of the applicant's request even though the effect of any
pronouncement may have been abolished by Resolution 748. The
Court should have acknowledged its inability to make an effective
judgment in light of the Security Council's Resolution while calling
on the parties to avoid any escalation of the dispute. He recognized
that although this was an awkward solution, the case was important
for all the parties to the Montreal Convention.
F. Judge Ajibola's Dissenting Opinion
Judge Bola Ajibola stated that while Resolution 748 fell within the
power and function of the Security Council under Chapter VII, it
was arguable that certain intrinsic defects might invalidate it. The
Resolution may be invalid on the basis that no one may be a judge
in their own cause; also, China's abstention may invalidate the Res-
olution under Article 27(3).'16 However, in view of the wording of
Resolution 748, he believed that the Court should have declined to
indicate the provisional measures Libya sought. Instead, the Court
should have indicated provisional measures proprio motu under Ar-
ticle 75 of the rules of the Court against both parties to ensure nonuse
of force or aggravation of the dispute." 7
114 Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 3 (Order on Provisional
Measures of Jan. 10).
"I Passage Through the Great Belt (Fin. v. Den.), 1991 I.C.J. 41 (Order of July
29).
116 Libya v. U.K., 1992 I.C.J. at 88 (Ajibola, J., dissenting).
117 Id.
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G. Ad-hoc Judge EI-Kosheri's Dissenting Opinion
Ad-hoc Judge El-Kosheri was the only judge who thought that
Resolution 748 had no binding force. His Honor thought that the
suppression of terrorism fell within the scope of the Security Council's
functions." 8 Citing the opinions in the Namibia case" 9 as authority,
he thought that the Court had power to determine whether resolutions
of the other organs of the United Nations had been taken in con-
formity with the Charter.12 He did not view the actions of the Council
as an attack on the Court but as a design to put pressure on Libya
to forfeit its sovereign rights under the Charter. He stated:
Yet the entire Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign
equality of all its Members, and the exercise of domestic jurisdiction
in matters such as extradition imposes on all other States, as well
as on the political organs of the United Nations, an obligation to
respect such inherent rights, unless the Court decides that such
exercise is contrary to international law.12'
Referring to Ramos v. Diaz,122 which indicated that the United
States was under no obligation to extradite absent a treaty, Judge
El-Kosheri thought that what is lawful for the United States must
be lawful for Libya. Therefore, he found the first paragraph of
Resolution 748 without legal effect, even on a prima facie basis.2 3
The circumstances of the case indicated that the suspects might not
get a fair trial in the United States or the United Kingdom.' 24 On
the other hand, a trial in Libya of individuals who were employees
"I Id. at 96, para. 8 (El-Kosheri, Ad-Hoc J., dissenting).
"9 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970),
1971 I.C.J. 1 (Jan. 29), at 45, para. 89; id. at 46, para. 94; id. at 53, para. 115
(judgment of the Court); id. at 331, para. 18, 332; id. at para. 19 (Gros, J.,
dissenting); id. at 72 (separate opinion of Judge Ammoun); id. at 131 (separate
opinion of Judge Petren); id. at 143-44 (separate opinion of Judge Onyeama); id.
at 180 (separate opinion of Judge DeCastro); id. at 226, para. 10; id. at 280, para.
91; id. at 293, para. 113; id. at 294, para. 115; id. at 299-301, Annex paras. 1-8
(Fitzmaurice, J., dissenting).
120 Libya v. U.K., 1992 I.C.J. at 101-102, paras. 23-25 (EI-Kosheri, Ad-Hoc J.,
dissenting).
121 Id. at 106, para. 42.
'2 Ramos v. Diaz, 149 F. Supp. 459 (S.D. Fla. 1959).
2 Libya v. U.K., 1992 I.C.J. at 107, para. 47 (EI-Kosheri, Ad-Hoc J., dissenting).
124 Id. at 111-12, paras. 61-63. Judge E1-Kosheri referred to the record of the
United Kingdom before the European Commission and the Court of Human Rights
with regard to treatment of terrorists and the adverse impact that media coverage
has on the possibility of a fair trial in the United States. Id.
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of the government, the conviction of whom could lead to international
responsibility of Libya, would not adequately protect the interests of
the United States and the United Kingdom. 125 His Honor would have
indicated proprio motu provisional measures that the suspects be
placed in the custody of another state that could provide a mutually
agreeable and appropriate forum for their trial. 126
H. Majority Opinions in the Lockerbie Case
Of the majority, Acting President Oda was mildly critical of the
members of the Council in that they must have been aware of the
preemptive impact of the Resolution on the determinations of the
Court.1 27 However, insofar as the powers of the Security Council
were concerned, he thought that a Resolution could have binding
force whether or not it was consonant with international law derived
from other sources. He also thought that the Council did not have
to evaluate all the circumstances before arriving at a decision. Because
the Council appeared to be acting within its sphere of competence
when it determined that there was a threat to peace and security,
the Court had no choice but to recognize the preeminence of its
Resolution.128 Judge Shahabuddeen agreed that the Court had to
presume the validity of the Security Council Resolution and that
Libya's rights under the Convention could not be enforced during
the life of the Resolution. 29
Several judges called for cooperation between the two organs. Judge
Ni thought that the legal and political determinations of a dispute
are complementary functions that need to be correlated and coor-
dinated; they are not competitive or mutually exclusive roles. Indeed,
the legal resolution of the dispute could be a decisive factor in the
peaceful political resolution of the dispute. 130 Similarly, Judge Lachs
thought that the Court and the Security Council should perform their
functions without prejudicing the other's exercising its powers. After
the passing of the Security Council's Resolution, there was no room
for further action by the Court. Because the dividing line between
legal and political disputes is blurred and law becomes an integral
part of international controversies, it is important that the two main
125 Id. at 112, para. 64.
126 Id. at 112, para. 65.
127 Id. at 17-18 (declaration of Acting President Oda).
128 Id.
129 Id. at 28 (separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
130 Id. at 21 (declaration of Judge Ni).
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organs with the power to issue binding decisions act in harmony with
each other.'3'
I. Opinions Concerning Appropriate Measures for the Court
Of the five dissenting judges, Judge Bedjaoui would have indicated
provisional measures although the indication would be ineffectual.3 2
Judge Ranjeva similarly would have pronounced on the merits of the
case."' All five thought that proprio motu measures would have been
appropriate. 3 4 Judge El-Kosheri, though, would have indicated an
order that the suspects be handed over to a third state while ar-
rangements for an impartial trial were made.'35 Of the majority,
Judges Lachs, 3 6 Shahabuddeen,'1 7 and Ni 38 also thought that the
Court had the power to indicate measures even though the Security
Council was seized of the matter by the wording of Resolution 748.
All of the Judges, except Ad-hoc Judge El-Kosheri, thought that the
Resolution was prima facie valid. Judge Shahabuddeen articulated
the issues raised by Libya's application, as follows: could the Security
Council override the rights of states under international law; if so,
were there any limitations on the power of the Security Council to
characterize a situation as an imminent threat to peace; are there
legal limits on the Security Council's power; what are those limits
and what body is competent to say what they are? Judge Shaha-
buddeen indicated that the view that the Security Council's powers
were unfettered was not unsustainable in law. However, the extent
by which the Court could determine these matters was a separate
question. 139
J. Issues Raised by the Opinions in the Lockerbie Case
Article 24(2) of the Charter states that the Security Council in
carrying out its functions is to act in accordance with the purposes
and principles of the United Nations.' 40 Article (1) of the Charter
states that one purpose of the United Nations is "to bring about by
M Id. at 27 (separate opinion of Judge Lachs).
132 Id. at 48, para. 31 (Bedjaoui, J., dissenting).
"3 Id. at 76, para. 12 (Ranjeva, J., dissenting).
134 Id.
" Id. at 112, para. 65 (EI-Kosheri, Ad-Hoc J., dissenting).
136 Id. at 26-27 (separate opinion of Judge Lachs).
117 Id. at 28-29 (separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
3 Id. at 21-22 (declaration of Judge Ni).
13 Id. at 32 (separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen).
,40 U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 2.
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peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes
.... 141 Thus, it is clear that the Council must act in conformity
with justice and international law. Chapter VII, however, gives the
Council wide powers in determining whether there is a threat to
international peace and security. But, under Article 25, Member States
only agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security
Council that are in accordance with the Charter. The basic problem,
as articulated by Judge Shahabuddeen, is the extent to which this
power can be used to override the legal rights of states. Judge
Fitzmaurice in his dissent in the Namibia case, thought that the
Security Council is inherently limited in that it can only act to maintain
and restore international peace and security. It cannot use its powers
to affect permanent territorial or administrative changes. 42 Forcing
a state to extradite two suspects in order to prevent a threat to world
peace probably does not constitute such a permanent alteration as
to be outside the powers of the Council.
More difficult, however, is the possible abuse of the Council's
power in characterizing a situation as constituting a threat to world
peace when in fact no such threat is believed to exist. This difficulty
is exacerbated by the Council's power to determine that a threat
exists. In their dissents in the Namibia case, Judges Fitzmaurice and
Gros both point out how easy it is to characterize a situation as one
posing a threat to world peace. They both thought that falsely char-
acterizing a situation as threatening when an ulterior motive exists
would be outside the power of the Security Council and that such
a resolution would not be binding on Member States. 43 It would be
difficult to disagree with such a proposition.
The problem, therefore, lies in characterizing the situation as being
one that does not pose an imminent threat to international peace
and security without evaluating the political determination of the
members of the Council. The United States and the United Kingdom
may well argue that they would be prepared to use military force
against Libya should it not extradite the two suspects. This of itself
could be said to constitute an imminent threat to world peace. More-
over, in light of the United States' actions in Libya, Grenada, Ni-
141 U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
141 South West Africa, 1971 I.C.J. at 226, para. viii; id. at 294, para. 115 (Fitz-
maurice, J., dissenting).
1 Id. at 294, para. 16; id. at 340-41, paras. 34-35 (Gros, J., dissenting).
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caragua, and Panama, the threat to use force could not be considered
a hollow one. 44 Thus, the characterization of the situation on this
level would be a difficult one to challenge. In contrast, it would be
more difficult to show that the United States and its allies had no
intention of using force against Libya, did not believe that Libya's
action constituted an imminent threat to peace, and were merely using
the compliance of the Council to bring pressure on the Libyan people
to rid themselves of a political enemy of the United States.
In the Namibia case, the majority did not question the power of
the Court to make a determination that a resolution of the Security
Council was adopted in conformity with the purposes and principles
of the Charter. 15 There, the issue arose in the exercise of the Court's
judicial function. 146 In making this determination, however, the Court
merely looked to the wording of the Resolutions to determine whether
the Security Council was acting within its power. 47 This may simply
be because of the difficulties involved in going behind a political
decision to examine its motivating forces. Judges Gros and Fitz-
maurice, on the other hand, saw no difficulty in looking to the motive
behind the Resolution.'" In the Lockerbie cases; Judge Weeramantry,
in his dissent, viewed the power of the Security Council when acting
under Chapter VII as unassailable:
However, once we enter the sphere of Chapter VII, the matter takes
on a different complexion, for the determination under Article 39
of the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or
act of aggression is one entirely within the discretion of the Council.
It would appear that the Council and no other is the judge of the
existence of the state of affairs which brings Chapter VII into
operation. '49
Judge Bedjaoui, on the other hand, thought that the Security
Council's Resolution could be challenged if the Resolution was an
attempt to deprive the Court of its power. 50 This implies an ability
to make a determination of the underlying motivation of the Res-
olution.
- Rosenthal, supra note 13, at A8.
"41 South West Africa, 1971 I.C.J. at 53, para. 115.
I" Id. at 45, para. 89.
141 Id. at 51-52, paras. 107-10.
I" Id. at 294, para. 116 (Fitzmaurice, J., dissenting); id. at 340-41, paras. 34-35
(Gros, J., dissenting).
149 Libya v. U.K., 1992 I.C.J. at 66 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).
I"o Id. at 47, para. 29 (Bedjaoui, J., dissenting).
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On the whole, it seems that the Court will be either unwilling or
unable to question Security Council Resolution 748 unless there is
something on its face to indicate an excessive use of power. One
defect of the Resolution is that it incorporates by reference to Res-
olution 731, the joint declaration of the United States and the United
Kingdom that Libya immediately pay compensation for the Lockerbie
bombing. On its face this constitutes a predetermination not only of
the guilt of the two suspects, but also the responsibility of Libya for
their action. If Libya's failure to immediately pay compensation forms
one of the factual grounds for the Security Council's determination
that Libya is not responding in a concrete manner to the requests
of Resolution 731, then Resolution 748 is based on a factual deter-
mination that is outside the Council's power and competence.
Further, calling on Libya to immediately pay the compensation,
as Paragraph 1 of the Resolution seems to do, would also offend
Articles 24(2) and 1(1) of the Charter. 5' These Articles require the
Council to bring about the settlement of international disputes in
conformity with the principles of justice and international law. 5 2
Since the Security Council cannot determine the guilt of the two
suspects, it cannot determine the responsibility of Libya. Therefore,
it cannot call Libya to pay immediate compensation without offending
concepts of justice and international law.'53 A problem with this
argument is that Resolution 748 is also premised on Libya's failure
to extradite the two suspects. However, there is no way to sever one
demand from the other, since the extradition of the suspects without
the payment of compensation would still have resulted in sanctions
under the clear wording of the Resolution.
The second prima facie defect of the Resolution is China's failure
to register a concurring vote as required by Article 27(3) of the
Charter. In its advisory opinion in the Namibia case, the Court,
relying on the practice of the Security Council, did not think that
the abstention of a permanent member invalidated a resolution. 5 4
This decision may have been a wise one in the context of the op-
erational defects of the Security Council during the cold war. In the
present context, however, where the political motivations behind the
"I UN CHARTER art. 1, para. 1; id. at art. 24, para. 2.
15 Id.
," See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 423-28 (2d ed.
1973).
,s4 Southwest Africa, 1971 I.C.J. at 22, paras. 21-22.
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Resolution are suspect, one would think that the clear terms of the
Charter should be followed.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the dog days of the Carter administration there was a joke
doing the rounds that Carter had died and gone to heaven where he
met Teddy Roosevelt. "Hey, Jimmy how are things in the U.S.A."?
asked Roosevelt. "Not so good," said Carter, "the Iranians took
our Embassy and held our diplomats hostage." "Hell," said Roos-
evelt, "you sent in the Marines, didn't you?" "No, but we took
them to the World Court." "That doesn't sound so good Jim, but
what else is happening?" "The Russians invaded Afghanistan." "The
Russians! You must have sent in the troops this time." "Well no,
Ted. But we didn't send our athletes to Moscow and applied economic
sanctions." "Don't say anything more," said Roosevelt, "next you'll
be telling me you gave away the Panama canal."
One cannot help but feel that President Roosevelt would be much
happier with a report from Presidents Reagan and Bush concerning
the current state of United States foreign policy. Many of the im-
mediate goals sought by both administrations have been achieved by
threats or use of force accompanied by a fluid interpretation of
international law. The Lockerbie initiative seems to be yet one more
example of the success of this policy. But what is the cost? One of
the casualties must be the International Court and through it, inter-
national law itself. Whatever the terms of the Charter, plainly the
present U.S. policy is to restrict the International Court to politically
non-controversial issues heard, if possible, before chambers of judges
from "like minded" states.
In the Nicaragua case, the United States argued that a complaint
of a threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state in contravention of Article 2(4) of the
Charter was a matter committed to the exclusive competence of the
other organs of the United Nations, particularly the Security Council.
The Court, moreover, could not deal with an ongoing armed conflict
without "overstepping proper judicial bounds."' 55 This attitude re-
,5' Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 26, para. 32 (June 27). The Court pointed out that the Security
Council's responsibility was primary and not exclusive. Id. at 27, para. 33. It
reaffirmed the position it took in the jurisdiction phase of the case where it said
that even after a determination under Article 39 "there is no necessary inconsistency
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flects a marked departure from the United States' policy towards the
United Nations system in the 1950's when it found itself blocked in
the Security Council,y 6 and in the 1970's when it was favorably
disposed towards the Court.'1"
It is ironic that when the Security Council was able for the first
time to act in the manner that was intended, it should do so in a
way that undermines the judicial organ of the United Nations. The
long term effect of the Lockerbie initiative may be evaluated by
considering how well the incident reflects on the validity of an in-
ternational rule of law, as formulated by Professor Henkin:
What matters is not whether the international system has legislative,
judicial, or executive branches, corresponding to those we are ac-
customed to seek in a domestic society; what matters is whether
international law is reflected in the policies of nations and in relations
between nations. The question is not whether there is an effective
legislature; it is whether there is a law that responds and corresponds
to the changing needs of a changing society. The question is not
whether there is an effective judiciary, but whether disputes are
resolved in an orderly fashion in accordance with international law.
Most important, the question is not whether law is enforceable or
even effectively enforced; rather whether law is observed, whether
it governs or influences behavior, whether international behavior
reflects stability and order.'
The bombing of Pan Am flight 103 was a dreadful and barbarous
act, and those responsible for it should be punished. But how high
a price should we be prepared to pay for revenge?
between Security Council action and adjudication by the Court. From a juridical
standpoint, the decisions of the Court and the actions of the Security Council are
entirely separate." Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 392 at 432, para. 90 (Jurisdiction of Court and
Admissibility of the Application).
136 See Franck, supra note 6; McWhinney, supra note 4, at 113-17.
1 See United States Response supra note 2 for quotation from State Department's
reply to U.N. questionnaire.
"I Louis HENKIN, How NATIONs BEHAVE 26 (2d ed. 1979).
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ANNEX A
RESOLUTION 731 (1992)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3033rd meeting,
on 21 January 1992
The Security Council,
Deeply disturbed by the world-wide persistence of acts of inter-
national terrorism in all its forms, including those in which States
are directly or indirectly involved, which endanger or take innocent
lives, have a deleterious effect on international relations and jeop-
ardize the security of States,
Deeply concerned by all illegal activities directed against interna-
tional civil aviation, and affirming the right of all States, in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations and relevant principles of
international law, to protect their nationals from acts of international
terrorism that constitute threats to international peace and security,
Reaffirming its resolution 286 (1970) of 9 September 1970, in which
it called on States to take all possible legal steps to prevent any
interference with international civil air travel,
Reaffirming also its resolution 635 (1989) of 14 June 1989, in which
it condemned all acts of unlawful interference against the security of
civil aviation and called upon all States to cooperate in devising and
implementing measures to prevent all acts of terrorism, including
those involving explosives,
Recalling the statement made on 30 December 1988 by the President
of the Security Council on behalf of the members of the Council
strongly condemning the destruction of Pan Am flight 103 and calling
on all States to assist in the apprehension and prosecution of those
responsible for this criminal act,
Deeply concerned over the results of investigations, which implicate
officials of the Libyan Government and which are contained in Se-
curity Council documents that include the requests addressed to the
Libyan authorities by France, 1/, 2/ the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland 2/, 3/ and the United States of America
2/, 4/, 5 in connection with the legal procedures related to the
attacks carried out against Pan American flight 103 and Union de
transports aerens flight 772;
Determined to eliminate international terrorism,
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1. Condemns the destruction of Pan American flight 103 and
Union de transports aerens flight 772 and the resultant loss of hun-
dreds of lives;
2. Strongly deplores the fact that the Libyan Government has not
yet responded effectively to the above requests to cooperate fully in
establishing responsibility for the terrorist acts referred to above
against Pan American flight 103 and Union de transports aerens flight
772;
3. Urges the Libyan Government immediately to provide a full
and effective response to those requests so as to contribute to the
elimination of international terrorism;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to seek the cooperation of the
Libyan Government to provide a full and effective response to those
requests;
5. Urges all States individually and collectively to encourage the
Libyan Government to respond fully and effectively to those requests;
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ANNEX B
RESOLUTION 748 (1992)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 3063rd meeting, on 31 'March
1992
The Security Council,
Reaffirming its resolution 731 (1992) of 21 January 1992,
Noting the reports of the Secretary-General, 1/ 2/
Deeply concerned that the Libyan Government has still not provided
a full and effective response to the requests in its resolution 731
(1992) of 21 January 1992,
Convinced that the suppression of acts of international terrorism,
including those in which States are directly or indirectly involved, is
essential for the maintenance of international peace and security,
Recalling that, in the statement issued on 31 January 1992 on the
occasion of the meeting of the Security Council at the level of heads
of State and Government, 3/ the members of the Council expressed
their deep concern over acts of international terrorism, and empha-
sized the need for the international community to deal effectively
with all such acts,
Reaffirming that, in accordance with the principle in Article 2,
paragraph 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, every State has
the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or partic-
ipating in terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized
activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such
acts, when such acts involve a threat or use of force,
Determining, in this context, that the failure by the Libyan Gov-
ernment to demonstrate by concrete actions its renunciation of ter-
rorism and in particular its continued failure to respond fully and
effectively to the requests in resolution 731 (1992) constitute a threat
to international peace and security,
Determined to eliminate international terrorism,
Recalling the right of States, under Article 50 of the Charter, to
consult the Security Council where they find themselves confronted
with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of
preventive or enforcement measures,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,
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1. Decides that the Libyan Government must now comply without
any further delay with paragraph 3 of resolution 731 (1992) regarding
the requests contained in documents S/23306, S/23308 and S/23309;
2. Decides also that the Libyan Government must commit itself
definitively to cease all forms of terrorist action and all assistance
to terrorist groups and that it must promptly, by concrete actions,
demonstrate its renunciation of terrorism;
3. Decides that, on 15 April 1992 all States shall adopt the meas-
ures set out below, which shall apply until the Security Council decides
that the Libyan Government has complied with paragraphs I and 2
above;
4. Decides also that all States shall:
(a) Deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or
overfly their territory if it is destined to land in or has taken off
from the territory of Libya, unless the particular flight has been
approved on grounds of significant humanitarian need by the Com-
mittee established by paragraph 9 below;
(b) Prohibit, by their nationals or from their territory, the supply
of any aircraft components to Libya, the provision of engineering
and maintenance servicing of Libyan aircraft or aircraft components,
the certification of airworthiness for Libyan aircraft, the payment of
new claims against existing insurance contracts and the provision of
new direct insurance for Libyan aircraft;
5. Decides further that all States shall:
(a) Prohibit any provision to Libya by their nationals or from
their territory of arms and related material of all types, including
the sale or transfer of weapons and ammunition, military vehicles
and equipment, paramilitary police equipment and spare parts for
the aforementioned, as well as the provision of any types of equip-
ment, supplies and grants of licensing arrangements, for the manu-
facture or maintenance of the aforementioned;
(b) Prohibit any provision to Libya by their nationals or from
their territory of technical advice, assistance or training related to
the provision, manufacture, maintenance, or use of the items in (a)
above;
(c) Withdraw any of their officials or agents present in Libya to
advise the Libyan authorities on military matters;
6. Decides that all States shall:
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(a) Significantly reduce the number and the level of the staff at
Libyan diplomatic missions and consular posts and restrict or control
the movement within their territory of all such staff who remain; in
the case of Libyan missions to international organizations, the host
State may, as it deems necessary, consult the organization concerned
on the measures required to implement this subparagraph;
(b) Prevent the operation of all Libyan Arab Airlines offices;
(c) Take all appropriate steps to deny entry to or expel Libyan
nationals who have been denied entry to or expelled from other States
because of their involvement in terrorist activities;
7. Calls upon all States, including States not members of the
United Nations, and all international organizations, to act strictly in
accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, notwith-
standing the existence of any rights or obligations conferred or im-
posed by any international agreement or any contract entered into
or any licence or permit granted prior to 15 April 1992;
8. Requests all States to report to the Secretary-General by 15
May 1992 on the measures they have instituted for meeting the
obligations set out in paragraphs 3 to 7 above;
9. Decides to establish, in accordance with rule 28 of its provi-
sional rules of procedure, a Committee of the Security Council con-
sisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the following
tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its observations
and recommendations:
(a) To examine the reports submitted pursuant to paragraph 8
above;
(b) To seek from all States further information regarding the
action taken by them concerning the effective implementation of the
measures imposed by paragraphs 3 to 7 above;
(c) To consider any information brought to its attention by States
concerning violations of the measures imposed by paragraphs 3 to 7
above and, in that context, to make recommendations to the Council
on ways to increase their effectiveness;
(d) To recommend appropriate measures in response to violations
of the measures imposed by paragraphs 3 to 7 above and provide
information on a regular basis to the Secretary-General for general
distribution to Member States;
(e) To consider and to decide upon expeditiously any application
by States for the approval of flights on grounds of significant hu-
manitarian need in accordance with paragraph 4 above;
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(f) To give special attention to any communications in accordance
with Article 50 of the Charter from any neighboring or other State
with special economic problems that might arise from the carrying
out of the measures imposed by paragraphs 3 to 7 above;
10. Calls upon all States to cooperate fully with the Committee
in the fulfilment of its task, including supplying such information as
may be sought by the Committee in pursuance of the present reso-
lution;
11. Requests the Secretary-General to provide all necessary assis-
tance to the Committee and to make the necessary arrangements in
the Secretariat for this purpose;
12. Invites the Secretary-General to continue his role as set out
in paragraph 4 of resolution 731 (1992);
13. Decides that the Security Council shall, every 120 days or
sooner should the situation so require, review the measures imposed
by paragraphs 3 to 7 above in the light of the compliance by the
Libyan Government with paragraphs 1 and 2 above taking into ac-
count, as appropriate, any reports provided by the Secretary-General
on his role as set out in paragraph 4 of resolution 731 (1992);
14. Decides to remain seized of the matter.
1/ S/23574.
2/ S/23672.
3/ S/23500.

